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BOSWELL. “You say, Dr. Johnson, that Garrick exhibits himself for 
a shilling. In this respect he is only on a footing with a lawyer who 
exhibits himself for his fee, and even will maintain any nonsense 
or absurdity, if the case requires it. Garrick refuses a play or a 
part which he does not like; a lawyer never refuses.” JOHNSON. 
“Why, Sir, what does this prove? [O]nly that a lawyer is worse.”1  
 How can lawyers help criminal defendants they know to be guilty 
avoid conviction and punishment? In Contextualist Answers to Skep-
ticism, and What A Lawyer Cannot Know,2 Professor William Ed-
mundson3 answers that nagging question, a question asked not only 
at cocktail parties, but also in law faculty lounges and legal ethics 
classes.  Prof. Edmundson’s answer is clever, even brilliant, and ap-
pealing, almost seductive. It is also, I am afraid, fundamentally 
flawed. But it is flawed in deeply interesting and revealing ways. In 
Part I of this Comment, I try to show why both Prof. Edmundson’s 
question and his answer are more important than he himself sug-
gests. In Part II, I try, at greater length, to isolate what I believe to 
be his answer’s fundamental flaw. Finally, in Part III, I suggest why 
Prof. Edmundson’s answer, flawed though I think it is, may mark an 
                                                                                                                    
 * Ruden, McClosky, Smith, Schuster & Russell Professor of Law, Florida State Uni-
versity. I am grateful to William Edmundson, Stephanie Gamble, Mark Seidenfeld, and 
Donald Weidner for their comments and encouragement and to Chenell Garrido and 
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 1. JAMES BOSWELL, THE LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON 213 (1952). 
 2. 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (2002).  
 3. Following prevailing convention, I will refer to my interlocutor as “Prof. Edmund-
son” or, for brevity’s sake, simply “Edmundson.” Those usages belie, however, the fact that 
he and I are on a friendly, familiar, and first-name basis; he was my most gracious host on 
a visit several years ago to his home institution, Georgia State University, and I his on his 
visit to Tallahassee last fall for the presentation of his Contextualist Answers paper to the 
law faculty at Florida State University. Thank you, Bill, for making that presentation and 
for publishing your piece in the pages of our Law Review. 
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important realization in legal ethics scholarship, underscoring the 
need for significant new work in several related directions.  
I.   INTRODUCTION: PROF. EDMUNDSON’S CONTEXTUALISM IN 
CONTEXT, OR THE STRANGE CAREER OF THE CRIMINAL DEFENSE 
PARADIGM  
 The question Prof. Edmundson addresses in his paper, big though 
it is in its own right, is actually a particularization of an even bigger 
question: “Can a good person be a good lawyer?” If Prof. Edmund-
son’s question is the most basic in criminal defense lawyering,4 this 
latter is, by general consensus, central to legal ethics as a whole.5 To 
fully appreciate the importance of Prof. Edmundson’s question, we 
need to see how closely it has come to be related to the other, broader 
question. 
 Not surprisingly, all legal ethicists and practicing lawyers answer 
the “can a good person be a good lawyer” question in the affirmative; 
no more surprisingly, as a legal ethicist and former lawyer, I am con-
vinced we are right. Where we differ is not on whether a good person 
can be a good lawyer, but on how. Here we divide logically, but by no 
means numerically, in half. On the one hand are those who believe 
that the good person, as a good lawyer, may (more strongly, should) 
do all that the letter of the law allows for any client. Call them the 
neutral partisans.6 On the other hand are those, myself and Ed-
mundson both included, who believe that other normative limits, 
sometimes narrower than the letter of the law, govern what the good 
person, as good lawyer, may do for at least some clients, at least 
                                                                                                                    
 4. See JAMES S. KUNEN, HOW CAN YOU DEFEND THOSE PEOPLE? THE MAKING OF A 
CRIMINAL LAWYER (1983); Barbara A. Babcock, Defending the Guilty, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 
175 (1983-84). 
 5. See Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-
Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1060 (1976); Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer’s Amoral 
Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 
613, 614; Gerald J. Postema, Self-Image, Integrity, and Professional Responsibility, in THE 
GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS’ ROLES AND LAWYERS’ ETHICS 286, 287 (David Luban ed., 1984) 
[hereinafter THE GOOD LAWYER]; see also DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE 109 (1988) 
[hereinafter LAWYERS & JUSTICE]; Stephen Gillers, Can a Good Lawyer Be a Bad Person?, 
84 MICH. L. REV. 1011 (1986) (reviewing THE GOOD LAWYER, supra, and STEPHAN LANDS-
MAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION AND DEFENSE (1984)); cf. THOMAS L. 
SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER 32 (1981) (“Is it possible to be a Christian 
and a lawyer?”); Harry T. Edwards, A Lawyer’s Duty to Serve the Public Good, 65 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1148 (1990). But cf. Serena Stier, Legal Ethics: The Integrity Thesis, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 
551, 560 (1991) (“To ask whether one can be both a good person and a good lawyer is to ask 
the wrong question.”). 
 6. Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 
605 (1985); William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Profes-
sional Ethics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29, 36-38. 
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some of the time.7 Call us the critics of neutral partisanship or, more 
positively, the reformers.8 
 The central question of legal ethics arises as a practical matter 
because lawyers are sometimes asked or required, in their role as 
lawyers, to do things that strike all conscientious people, lawyers and 
non-lawyers alike, as morally suspect. These apparent conflicts be-
tween what theorists call role morality and ordinary morality9 in-
clude, to put it in classical terms, making the true look false and the 
false, true. Discrediting truthful witnesses is an example of the for-
mer; arguing for factual or legal positions in which you don’t believe 
nicely illustrates the latter.10 
 For all their disagreement on these matters, legal ethicists have 
tended to agree on one context where what we have called neutral 
partisanship, or something very close to it, should be practiced.11 
That context is criminal defense. In what has come to be called the 
criminal defense paradigm,12 the way to be a good person and a good 
lawyer is to do all that the law allows to acquit your clients, even cli-
ents whom you know to be guilty, dangerous, and unrepentant. Some 
have argued that this should include assisting the client in present-
ing perjured testimony.13 Although neither the law nor many legal 
scholars go quite this far, both the law and virtually all commenta-
tors agree that the criminal defense lawyer has, to quote the oft-
                                                                                                                    
 7. This second group is actually and theoretically divisible into two subgroups, those 
who believe that the extra-legal, supplemental norms are public, accessible to and binding 
upon all lawyers, and those who believe otherwise. The latter tend to invoke norms from 
particular religious traditions, though non-public norms can be, and occasionally are, im-
ported from secular systems as well. For present purposes, however, we can safely ignore 
these subclasses; for more (much, much more) on why they matter, see Rob Atkinson, A 
Dissenter’s Commentary on the Professionalism Crusade, 74 TEX. L. REV. 259, 269 (1995) 
and Rob Atkinson, Beyond the New Role Morality, 51 MD. L. REV. 853, 883 (1992). 
 8. There is no generally accepted, universally used, term for neutral partisanship’s 
opponents. I choose “reformers” because it implies, almost literally, that neutral partisan-
ship is a departure from an earlier, more desirable position, contrary to the suggestion that 
neutral partisanship has any logical or historical, much less normative, priority. Further-
more, for those versed in theology, the term reformer has additional resonances, for me 
quite strongly positive. 
 9. For perhaps the clearest elaboration of this distinction in the context of legal eth-
ics, see LAWYERS & JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 104-27. 
 10. See WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS’ ETHICS 
171 (1998) (giving these examples in the context of criminal defense). 
 11. See id. at 170, 237 n.1 (noting that “[s]ome people who join me in rejecting the 
Dominant View [neutral partisanship] make an exception for criminal defense,” and citing 
the work of fellow reformers David Luban, Richard Wasserstrom, and Deborah Rhode). 
 12. LAWYERS & JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 65. 
 13. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS 119-20 (1990) (ar-
guing that criminal defense counsel should be allowed to present perjury testimony just as 
they present other testimony). 
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quoted language of Justice Byron White, “a different mission.”14 
 Just how different that mission is, however, is a point of consider-
able disagreement between neutral partisans and their critics. Curi-
ously, each school tends to minimize the “difference” of the criminal 
defense paradigm, but in opposite directions. Reformers try to move 
the criminal defense paradigm toward all other lawyering, which, for 
them, involves checking lawyerly advocacy with supplemental 
norms;15 neutral partisans try to move all lawyering in the direction 
of the criminal defense paradigm, which, for them, involves pressing 
any client’s advantage to the fullest extent of the letter of the law.16  
 All lawyers, according to neutral partisans, should be as unal-
loyedly loyal to all clients, in all causes, as criminal defense lawyers 
are to those charged with the severest of crimes. Reformers have re-
sponded to this position in two related ways. First, and with greatest 
accord, they have tried to distinguish the need for extraordinary zeal 
in criminal defense from the kind of client loyalty appropriate in 
other contexts.17 This has been a careful, even judicious, process. In 
the initial phase, critics of neutral partisanship showed how routine, 
non-adversarial, in-office counseling differs from all litigation, not 
just criminal defense, in ways that make the injection of public-
spirited advice desirable, even essential, to the proper lawyerly role.18 
Next, they pointed that, in some civil litigation contexts, the criminal 
defense tables are effectively turned, from individual Davids defend-
ing against the Goliath state to corporate Goliaths like Kerr-McGee 
going after individual Davids like Karen Silkwood.19  Finally, they 
argued that, even when private clients are civil defendants, the simi-
larities to criminal defense may be more diagramatic than real. This 
is particularly true, they point out, where large, well-heeled corpo-
rate defendants can spend their opponents—employees, consumers, 
                                                                                                                    
 14. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 256 (1967) (White, J., dissenting in part and 
concurring in part); see Harry I. Subin, The Criminal Defense Lawyer’s “Different Mission”: 
Reflections on the “Right” to Present a False Case, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 125 (1987). 
 15. SIMON, supra note 10, at 170-94; Subin, supra note 14; Harry I. Subin, Is This Lie 
Necessary? Further Reflections on the Right to Present a False Defense, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 689 (1988). 
 16. Pepper, supra note 5, at 622 (“In the criminal context the moral value of full ac-
cess to all that the law allows is simply clearer and more dramatic.”). 
 17. See id. at 621 (“The critics [of neutral partisanship] suggest that a role justified by 
the rather unusual context of the criminal justice system simply is not justified in the far 
more common lawyer roles.”).  
 18. Lon Fuller & John D. Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint 
Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1160-61 (1958); Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism 
and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CAL. L. REV. 669 (1978). 
 19. LAWYERS & JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 64. See Murray L. Schwartz, The Zeal of the 
Civil Advocate, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 543. 
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and even government agencies—into unfavorable settlement or out-
right defeat, despite the merits of their cases.20 
 This series of arguments cleared the field for the reformers’ sec-
ond line of assault on the criminal defense paradigm.21 Having coun-
tered every effort of neutral partisans to expand the criminal defense 
paradigm into other areas of law, critics then turned their analysis 
on criminal defense itself. Several accepted elements of criminal de-
fense lawyering, they have argued, are not always required, and 
hence not universally justified, by the social policies that support the 
criminal defense lawyer’s “different mission.” The policies typically 
invoked are preventing the conviction of the innocent and protecting 
the dignity interests—rights, if you prefer—of even the guilty.22 But 
neither of these policies necessarily entails helping the known guilty 
avoid conviction whenever they are prosecuted.23  
 At least in principle, these policies could be served as well by a 
“friendly inquisitor” as by a “zealous advocate,” to use Edmundson’s 
useful distinction. In his words, 
[b]oth roles are designed to assure that no one is punished unless 
on evidence that excludes reasonable possibilities of factual inno-
cence. But the friendly inquisitor’s job is to assemble facts, and if 
the facts exclude reasonable doubts about guilt, her remaining job 
is to bring the offender to accept responsibility, not to make efforts 
to help him avoid it. The zealous advocate, on the other hand, 
brings a far stricter epistemic standard to the facts, and she oper-
ates throughout on the presumption (if not the belief) that respon-
sibility cannot justly be assigned to the accused. It is this distinc-
                                                                                                                    
 20. Id. at 58-66; see also SIMON, supra note 10, at 53-76 (arguing against instrumen-
talist defenses of neutral partisanship). 
 21. We should note that not all the reformers have gone along. See David Luban, Are 
Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729 (1993) (criticizing William Simon’s 
critique of neutral partisanship in the context of criminal defense).  
 22. See SIMON, supra note 10, at 177 (“We can all agree on a system that provides 
strong opportunities for the establishment of innocence and for the assertion of some in-
trinsic procedural rights.”). 
 23. Id. at 190; see also Subin, supra note 14; Murray Schwartz, On Making the True 
Look False and the False Look True, 41 SW. L.J. 1135 (1988). The official position of the 
ABA came close to that of the reformers on the point of discrediting truthful witnesses, but 
only for a while. As Murray Schwartz pointed out: 
 The ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice suggests that a 
lawyer’s knowledge that the witness is testifying truthfully “may affect the 
method and scope of cross-examination or impeachment,” STANDARDS RELATING 
TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Standard 7.6(b) at 132 (1974), 
and the Commentary implies that the lawyer should not impeach a truthful wit-
ness (Approved Draft, at 272). 
Schwartz, supra note 18, at 673 n.12. But that was 1974; the current version makes clear 
that “[d]efense counsel’s belief or knowledge that the witness is telling the truth does not 
preclude cross-examination.” STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 4-7.6(b) (1992).   
30  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:25 
 
tive difference between the roles of the friendly inquisitor and the 
zealous advocate that is in need of justification.24 
 That justification, as Edmundson points out, has traditionally 
been instrumentalist. Unless the criminal defense lawyer acts as a 
zealous advocate, not just a friendly inquisitor, the criminal justice 
system cannot effectively guarantee the acquittal of the innocent and 
the dignity-based rights of the guilty.  What the reformers argue is 
possible in principle, the neutral partisans deny is possible in fact. 
 But this, as Edmundson demonstrates, is not where the argu-
ment over the central issue in criminal defense work begins. That 
beginning, back to which he effectively takes us, is the following syl-
logism: 
 Major premise: Knowingly to help another do harm or injustice 
is, prima facie, to do harm or injustice oneself. 
 Minor premise: When criminal defense lawyers knowingly assist 
the guilty in avoiding conviction, they knowingly assist in harm or 
injustice. 
 Conclusion: Therefore, criminal defense lawyers, prima facie, do 
harm or injustice themselves. 
As Edmundson points out, both neutral partisans and their critics 
accept the validity of this argument. They agree that assisting the 
known guilty in avoiding conviction is a prima facie wrong; what 
they disagree on is whether that prima facie wrong is justifiable. 
Neutral partisans maintain that it is justifiable as a necessary 
means to deeply shared values; their critics argue that it isn’t.  
 Thus all legal ethicists, neutral partisans as well as their critics, 
have traditionally taken criminal defense as a special case of this 
general principle. There has never been much question that know-
ingly assisting a criminal defendant in avoiding a just penalty for his 
or her crime is prima facie a harm to the criminal’s victims, or an in-
justice to society, or a vice on your own part, or all of the above.25  
 Defenders of the criminal defense paradigm have, accordingly, 
almost invariably proceeded to justify this prima facie wrong that 
lies at the root of the prevailing conception of the criminal defense 
lawyer’s role. As Edmundson points out, these defenses follow mod-
ern moral philosophy more generally along one of three routes. Ei-
ther the consequences of the prima facie harm promise a preponder-
ance of some social good, or the moral dignity of the criminal defen-
dant trumps any such harm, or any such harms are part of social ar-
rangements that self-interested individuals would assent to ab initio.  
                                                                                                                    
 24. Edmundson, supra note 2, at 17. 
 25. Prof. Edmundson himself concedes that a harm occurs when the guilty are acquit-
ted; as we shall see, he is at pains, not to deny the harm, but to absolve the guilty defen-
dants’ lawyers of any culpability for that harm, even prima facie. Id. at 19. 
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 As we have seen, these defenses are, as it were, on the defensive, 
under sustained assault from reformers. What Edmundson offers is a 
radically new defense, in the nature of a counterattack. Edmundson 
reminds us that the conclusion of our syllogism need not be taken for 
granted; it can, in fact, be attacked at either of two obvious points, 
the major premise or the minor. 
 The major premise, an obvious corollary of the “no harm” princi-
ple,26 may seem compelling and commonsensical to most of us, but it 
is hardly unassailable. Some of Socrates’s more outré interlocutors 
denied it, or came extremely close, in identifying justice with the will 
of the strong: Thrasymachus in Book I of the Republic;27 Callicles in 
the final round of the Gorgias.28 Nietzsche, in his more exultantly 
blond-beastly, proto-Nazi moods, notoriously denounced it as close to 
the root of all evil (or, as he put it, bad);29 Ayn Rand is a somewhat 
less extreme, if much less eloquent, fellow-traveller.30 Theirs, not 
surprisingly, is not the road Prof. Edmundson recommends.  
 He, instead, attacks the minor premise, the assumption that 
criminal defense lawyers knowingly assist the guilty in avoiding con-
viction. Rather than concede that criminal defense lawyers need to 
justify the prima facie wrong of knowingly assisting the guilty in 
avoiding punishment, he denies that their assistance is “knowing,” 
(the minor premise in our syllogism). Here lies the ingeniousness of 
his approach; it opens a new front in the defense of the criminal de-
fense paradigm. And it opens that front by marshalling a sophisti-
cated philosophical argument that draws less from ethics, the stan-
dard resort of reformers, than from epistemology, a discipline they 
invoke much less often. With respect to criminal defense lawyers, 
Edmundson’s position is not a mere “forgive them, for they know not 
what they do.” He argues that, if they don’t know what they’re doing, 
then they do no moral wrong, prima facie or otherwise, even if what 
they are doing works very grievous individual or social harm. Thus, 
unlike earlier defenders of the criminal defense paradigm, he does 
not merely tell us to lower our accusing fingers, now that a prima fa-
cie wrong has been explained away. Beyond that, he chides us, at 
least implicitly, for ever having raised an accusation in the first 
place. 
 What is more, Edmundson sweeps within his defense some of the 
very practices that reformers have argued cannot be justified by the 
                                                                                                                    
 26. On the “no harm” principle, generally, see 1 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS 
OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO OTHERS (1984). 
 27. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 15 (Allan Bloom trans., 1968) 
 28. PLATO, THE GORGIAS 77-80 (Walter Hamilton trans., 1960). 
 29. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS 28-34 (Walter Kaufmann 
& R.J. Hollingdale trans., 1969). 
 30. AYN RAND, THE VIRTUE OF SELFISHNESS (1964). 
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standard instrumentalist defenses of the criminal defense lawyer’s 
role. He explicitly defends presenting false defenses,31 “making the 
false look true,” and his defense could easily be extended to “making 
the true look false,” not only the general practice of discrediting 
truthful witnesses, but also the particular practice of “brutal cross-
examination” of complaining witnesses in rape cases.32  
 Perhaps most significantly, Edmundson’s argument could be ex-
trapolated beyond the criminal defense paradigm to all other modes 
of lawyering—not just civil contexts analogous to criminal trials, like 
child custody cases, where the state threatens a single individual 
with calamitous personal loss, but also the entire spectrum of corpo-
rate representation, from defending litigation brought by the gov-
ernment with respect to past actions to the most insulated in-office 
counseling about proposed future courses of conduct. The exchange 
between Boswell and Johnson on which he relies is certainly suscep-
tible, on its face, to just such an expansive reading. What Johnson 
defends, it is worth remembering, is not just criminal defense but, 
more generally, “supporting a cause which you know to be bad.”33  
 To see how this extrapolation from Edmundson’s argument would 
go, consider another syllogism, which starts where the first leaves 
off. For neutral partisans and for Edmundson, though for different 
reasons, criminal defense lawyers are not morally culpable for the 
harms or injustice they assist in when they work to acquit the guilty. 
This is where the second syllogism begins: 
 Major premise: Criminal defense lawyers are not morally culpa-
ble for the harms or injustice they assist in when they represent 
their clients as zealously as the law allows, because of A (the tradi-
tional, instrumentalist reasons) or B (Edmundson’s epistemologi-
cal reason). 
 Minor premise: Other lawyers (some or all) are like criminal de-
fense lawyers in the representation of their clients, because of A 
(the traditional reasons) or B (Edmundson’s reason). 
 Conclusion: Other lawyers (some or all) are not morally culpable 
for the harms they assist in when they represent their clients as 
zealously as the law allows. 
                                                                                                                    
 31. Edmundson, supra note 2, at 18-19. 
 32. See David Luban, Partisanship, Betrayal and Autonomy in the Lawyer-Client Re-
lationship: A Reply to Stephen Ellman, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1004, 1027-28 (1990) (detailing 
elements of “brutal cross-examination”).  
 33. David Luban has convincingly shown why, as a general defense of neutral parti-
sanship, the Johnsonian position cannot hold. LAWYERS & JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 26-29. 
The crux of his long and careful argument is nicely captured in this parodic reductio ad ab-
surdum: “‘Imagine that!’ Dr. Johnson exclaims. ‘I was wrong about the weakness of our 
case! My arguments turned out to be sound after all—for the judge relied on them in the 
opinion!’” Id. at 29. In important ways, Luban’s argument against Johnson’s position an-
ticipates Edmundson’s reliance on that position, though it cuts much more strongly as to 
issues of law than issues of fact. 
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 As we have seen, neutral partisanship’s critics have long, and I 
think persuasively, attacked this extrapolation in terms of the tradi-
tional, instrumentalist defenses of the criminal defense paradigm. 
Whatever social goods the criminal defense paradigm may be plausi-
bly said to be necessary to advance, it has been shown that the same 
zealous representation is not necessary on the part of civil lawyers to 
advance those goals. These critics have, in effect, shown that the mi-
nor premise in our second syllogism is false, or at least subject to 
deep doubts, insofar as it relies on A, the traditional reasons for the 
criminal defense paradigm, because those reasons do not apply to 
other lawyers.  
 Notice, however, that Edmundson’s argument offers an alterna-
tive version of the minor premise, in terms of B, his epistemological 
defense of the criminal defense paradigm. It is not too much to say 
that, if Edmundson’s argument is sound, the entire decades-long de-
bate between neutral partisans and their critics has been shifted 
radically in favor of the former. 
 Edmundson himself, I hasten to underscore, does not attempt 
these extrapolations; in all likelihood, he would lament them.34 His 
case is, in its own terms, limited to the criminal defense paradigm. 
But Prof. Edmunson’s defense of neutral partisanship in the context 
of criminal defense, if successful, would, as our second syllogism 
shows, apply to other contexts as well. If the history of that paradigm 
is any indication, those extrapolations will be made. This, then, is the 
context in which Edmundson makes his contextualist case; these are 
the stakes in the game he invites us to play. In the next part, I will 
try to show why Edmundson’s argument is fundamentally unsound, 
why the reformers’ criticisms of neutral partisanship have lost none 
of their purchase, in either the criminal defense paradigm or else-
where. 
II.   ANALYSIS: WHY PROF. EDMUNDSON’S EPISTEMOLOGICAL 
APPROACH CANNOT ANSWER THE BASIC QUESTION ABOUT THE 
CRIMINAL DEFENSE PARADIGM 
 Edmundson candidly admits, at the outset, the apparent oddity 
of denying that criminal defense lawyers know that their clients are 
guilty. To account for that oddity, he reminds us of an important 
epistemological point about the relationship between ordinary and 
special claims of knowledge. We can, he points out, comfortably af-
firm that we know things that we can’t prove absolutely, where 
“prove absolutely” means ruling out all imaginable possibilities of er-
                                                                                                                    
 34. So, I can now report, he has confirmed to me in our email correspondence. E-mail 
from Professor William Edmundson to Professor Rob Atkinson (Aug. 14, 2002, 11:47 EST) 
(on file with author). 
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ror. We (well, most of us) believe that the universe is billions of years 
old; yet, as Bertrand Russell famously pointed out, “there is no logi-
cal impossibility in the view that the world was created five minutes 
ago, complete with memories and records.”35 Even more mundanely, 
we know that the sun will come up tomorrow, as we (again, most of 
us) know it has for billions of years. Yet, as David Hume pointed out, 
the causal nexus between past and future is surprisingly difficult to 
establish;36 as your stockbroker will tell you (more readily now than a 
year ago), past performance is no guarantee of future earnings. As 
Descartes pointed out, further back and more radically still, we can 
doubt pretty much everything we experience—except, ironically, our 
most immediate doubts.37 
 Major philosophical reputations have been made, in very different 
times and places,38 by showing us how well we can get along without 
absolute knowledge. Reasonable certainty serves us well enough, day 
in and day out, as an entirely adequate substitute for absolute 
knowledge; if we can’t rule out all imaginable sources of error, we can 
readily enough rule out all relevant sources.  
 Similarly, ordinary language about knowledge serves us quite 
adequately for ordinary life—or, more precisely, for most situations 
in life. What we ordinarily mean when we say we know something is 
that we have eliminated not all possible doubts, but all contextually 
relevant doubts. Thus, when someone tells us that we don’t “really” 
know what we think we know, we know that the asserted “really” is 
in inverted commas and that the person making the assertion is a 
philosopher, professional or amateur. If we begin to suspect that the 
“really” really isn’t in inverted commas, then we also begin to suspect 
that we are talking, not to a philosopher, but to a nut (assuming we 
know our interlocutor to be older than nineteen and not one of our 
own offspring). 
 The insight that reasonable belief is almost always enough carries 
a corollary point, on which Edmundson relies more directly: In epis-
temological language, as in the law of torts and elsewhere, reason-
ableness varies with the circumstances. Sitting in a restaurant and 
                                                                                                                    
 35. BERTRAND RUSSELL, AN OUTLINE OF PHILOSOPHY 7 (1960). 
 36. DAVID HUME, AN INQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 72-89 (Charles 
W. Hendel ed., The Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1955) (1748). 
 37. RENE DESCARTES, DISCOURSE ON METHOD 20-21 (Laurence J. LaFleur trans., Lib-
eral Arts Press 1950) (1637). 
 38. I’m thinking of Kant’s effort to answer Hume’s skepticism, see IMMANUEL KANT, 
CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON (J.M.D. Meiklejohn trans., P.F. Collier 1901) (1787), and the 
Ordinary Language Philosophers’ response to reductionists like Bertrand Russell. Illustra-
tive of a very wide field are J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (1975), and 
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 1953). 
Prof. Edmundson has reminded me that the American Pragmatists, particularly John 
Dewey, are another case-in-point. See JOHN DEWEY, THE QUEST FOR CERTAINTY (1930). 
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asking the waiter for something to cut your meat with, you know 
you’ll get a steak knife; if what you want is a microtome, you know 
you’ll have to ask for it specifically. If you are in the cytology lab, on 
the other hand, these expectations about cutlery will be reversed 
(and, following linguistic conventions as old as the Norman Con-
quest, the mammalian muscle before you won’t be beef, pork, or mut-
ton, but cattle, swine, or sheep). So it is with language more gener-
ally, including the language of knowledge. We know that what we 
know—more precisely, what we need to know to claim we know—
varies with the situation. As the philosophers of linguist analysis are 
wont to say, in their typically flippant way, we play lots of games39 or 
do lots of things40 with words, and we typically know the rules and 
the tools. 
 But some tasks require special tools, and, in life and in language, 
we have to fashion what we don’t find in the literal or metaphorical 
toolbox. Microbiologists need microtomes, not steak knives; as Kath-
arine Ross told Paul Newman and Robert Redford in Butch Cassidy 
and the Sundance Kid, “your line of work requires a specialized 
vocabulary.”41 In that respect, at least, our epistemological enquiry is 
like their bank robbing. To show how well we get along without 
absolute knowledge, we need to be able to distinguish our everyday 
sense of “knowing” from more restrictive and demanding senses. This 
is not to say that our ordinary use of “know” is sloppy, much less 
wrong, any more than we are wrong or sloppy to say, in a post-
Copernican world, that the sun rises in the east and sets in the west, 
or to cut our meat at the table with a steak knife rather than a scal-
pel, or a microtome. What’s right—more precisely, what’s appropri-
ate or reasonable—depends on the task at hand, be it verbal or culi-
nary. 
 The meanings of words, then, like the functions of tools, are task-
specific.42 If we come up with a new task, we may need to find or cre-
ate new tools. Where the task is a language-task, the new tools will 
be new terms, or new meanings for old terms. From Edmundson’s 
perspective, defending bank robbers, like bank robbery itself, can be 
seen as just such a special task, requiring just such a specialized vo-
cabulary. For that task, we may need, as we do in epistemology, a 
special sense of the word “know.” In particular, he maintains that we 
                                                                                                                    
 39. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 38, § 23, at 11e (“Here the term ‘language-game’ is 
meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activ-
ity, or of a form of life.”). 
 40. AUSTIN, supra note 38. 
 41. BUTCH CASSIDY AND THE SUNDANCE KID (20th Century Fox 1969). 
 42. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 38, § 11, at 6e (“Think of the tools in a tool-box: there 
is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a screw-driver, a rule, a glue-pot, glue, nails, and screws.—The 
functions of words are as diverse as the functions of these objects.”). 
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need a sense of “know” for criminal defense lawyers’ knowledge of 
their clients’ crimes that is almost as restrictive as the deeply skepti-
cal, gold-standard, “absolute knowledge” that epistemologists some-
times invoke. Edmundson calls this “film noir” skepticism. Before the 
criminal defense lawyer can be said to know a client is guilty under 
that standard, “the lawyer must rule out the possibility that by some 
unfathomable whim of fate, a kaleidoscope of otherwise disjointed 
appearances has frozen itself into a damning configuration.”43 This 
standard, as Edmundson indicates, is analogous to, but even stricter 
than, our criminal justice system’s high standard of proof for convic-
tion, proof “beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
 Under that latter, proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard, we 
could say that, for purposes of deciding whether a criminal defendant 
is guilty, jurors do not “know” the defendant did what he or she had 
done even though, in other contexts, they might “know” it well 
enough. Thus the jurors in the O.J. Simpson trial could be said not to 
“know,” for purposes of convicting him of murder, that O.J. killed his 
ex-wife. But they probably “know” it well enough not to recommend 
him for a blind date.  
 Notice two things about this example. First, we as a society have 
discussed the Simpson trial, and many another criminal trial, long 
and well without invoking any special sense of the word “know.” Why 
didn’t the jury convict someone who seemed so obviously guilty? The 
widely believed, but less than charitable answer, of course, was that 
Johnny Cochran played the “race card.” The less cynical, if less plau-
sible, answer was that, because of reasonable doubts about the evi-
dence traceable to a suspiciously racist police department, the jury 
found that the government had not proved its case “beyond a reason-
able doubt.” 
 But what, many lay-folk wondered aloud, about the second trial, 
in which a different jury found Mr. Simpson liable for the wrongful 
death of his ex-wife? We lawyers explained (the more telegenic 
among us on TV): In the later civil trial, with its lower, preponder-
ance of the evidence standard, the jury was able to find Mr. Simpson 
civilly liable for the very same alleged wrong. To make it an episte-
mological sound-bite, with “scare quotes” filling in for voice-
inflections:  
It’s a double standard. Even if the jurors in both cases “knew” Mr. 
Simpson killed his ex-wife, the jurors in the first trial could find 
the evidence insufficient for a criminal conviction, even though the 
jurors in the second trial could find essentially the same evidence 
adequate for civil liability.  
                                                                                                                    
 43. Edmundson, supra note 2, at 7. 
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We, lawyers and layfolk alike, can explain the different outcomes in 
the civil and criminal Simpson cases, compare them, and criticize 
them, all without invoking any special sense of the term “know.” 
 The second thing to note about the Simpson case is that we all 
understand (or, if you will, know) why the jurors were required to use 
a higher standard of proof, to be more skeptical, in the criminal case. 
They had a very serious task before them: determining a fellow citi-
zen’s guilt or innocence of a heinous act, to which we attach the most 
severe of possible penalties, loss of liberty and even life. We as a soci-
ety insist that, before we make that determination and attach those 
penalties, we are very, very sure we are correct. To be as sure as we 
reasonably can, we require our jurors to resolve all plausible doubts 
in favor of the accused. 
 Another part of that assurance is to require that every criminal 
defendant be represented by a lawyer, whose job it is to make sure 
that the government meets that high standard of proof. How the 
lawyer goes about that, of course, is a matter of much dispute, to 
which we shall return shortly. But notice, for now, that, whatever the 
particular requirements of that role, it has two general features in 
common with the two we have just seen with respect to jurors. First, 
we all understand (again, if you will, know) that it is defined as a 
means to, and justified in terms of, our deep-seated insistence on pro-
tecting criminal defendants. Whatever special things the criminal de-
fense lawyer has to do, we know the reason for their having to be 
done. Second, we can discuss and explain those things, and the rea-
sons for them, without invoking special standards of knowledge. In 
particular, we don’t typically say, with Edmundson, that the criminal 
defense lawyers treat clients differently from the way we treat them, 
or from the way lawyers treat other clients, because they know less 
about their clients than we do. Indeed, we typically suspect that, 
unless criminal defense lawyers take special steps to preserve their 
ignorance,44 they know a good deal more about their clients than we 
do. That suspicion, of course, is at the root of our cocktail party ques-
tion about criminal defense lawyers: How can they try to acquit those 
they know to be guilty? 
 And that, as we saw at the outset, is the very question with which 
Edmundson wrestles. He would have criminal defense lawyers give 
                                                                                                                    
 44. The most famous, or infamous, is “the Lecture,” from ROBERT TRAVER, ANATOMY 
OF A MURDER 35-36 (1958). The lawyer silences the client, tells the client a range of possi-
ble defenses, and lets the client fill in the necessary facts; if the sequence is properly fol-
lowed, the lawyer supposedly can’t “know” when the client is lying. Id. See also KENNETH 
MANN, DEFENDING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: A PORTRAIT OF ATTORNEYS AT WORK (1985) (de-
scribing “avoidance techniques,” ways developed by white collar criminal defense lawyers 
“to avoid inquiry that protect them from potential accusations of unethical misconduct by 
others and from a personal feeling of ethical impropriety that would make it difficult to 
perform their work”). 
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an answer that is, to them and to us, very odd: “Because we criminal 
defense lawyers don’t know our clients are guilty.” In response, it 
makes perfect sense for us to ask, “What do you mean, you don’t 
know?” We know either that they are being defensive to the point of 
disingenuousness or that they are invoking a very special sense of 
the word “know.” Edmundson would have us believe it is the latter; 
more precisely, he wants us to substitute the latter for the former. 
 To appreciate fully the specialness of this criminal defense notion 
of knowledge, consider, again, the two Simpson cases (the first crimi-
nal, the second civil). In the first, under our standard conception of 
the criminal defense function, Simpson’s lawyers were permitted, 
even expected, to put the state on its proof as to each aspect of its 
case, even if those lawyers knew him to be guilty as charged. In the 
parallel civil damages case, by contrast, matters stand quite differ-
ently. Under the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct45 and the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,46 lawyers representing civil defen-
dants are forbidden to contest what they know to be true. If they 
know there is no defense of their clients’ conduct other than denying 
facts they know to be true, they must concede liability. They may as-
sert affirmative defenses (the statute of limitations, for example), 
and they may contest the amount of damages. But, in contrast to the 
criminal case, they may not deny what they know their client did, in 
an ordinary language sense of the word “know.” 
 Nor are criminal defense lawyers themselves wholly absolved of 
ordinary standards of knowledge. For precisely this reason, as Ed-
mundson himself concedes, the law of perjury is a particular puzzle 
for his theory.47  As he notes, the ABA Model Rules forbid a lawyer, 
even a criminal defense lawyer to “‘knowingly . . . fail to disclose a 
material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to avoid as-
sisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client . . . [or] offer evi-
dence that the lawyer knows to be false.’”48 If a lawyer knows that a 
client or witness has offered perjured testimony, the lawyer must in-
form the tribunal; if the lawyer knows the client is about to testify 
falsely, the lawyer must forbid it. How can these requirements apply 
                                                                                                                    
 45. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (1999). California’s parallel provisions, 
which would have governed the Simpson case, are admittedly less clear on this point. See 
CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5-200(A), (B) (1988) (requiring lawyers to em-
ploy “such means only as are consistent with truth” and forbidding them to “seek to mis-
lead the judge, judicial officer, or jury by an artifice or false statement of fact or law”).  
 46. FED. R. CIV. P. 11. 
 47. Edmundson, supra note 2, at 7-8. 
 48. Id. at 7 (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (1999)). See also ABA 
Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 87-353 (1987) (clarifying, in the 
wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Nix v. Whiteside, that this rule applies with full 
force to criminal defense counsel). 
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to criminal defense lawyers, if, on Edmundson’s hypothesis, they 
cannot know when their clients are guilty of perjury? 
 Here is Edmundson’s answer: “Knowledge of the underlying of-
fense simply does not enter into the lawyer’s duty to report client or 
witness perjury. What the lawyer ‘knows’ is the existence of an 
irreconcilably inconsistent prior account; it is unnecessary to suppose 
in addition that the lawyer knows which (if either) is the true ac-
count.”49 But that knowledge is precisely what the law of perjury does 
suppose, as the pre-condition of the lawyer’s duty to report. Other-
wise, Edmundson’s argument proves far too much, and the lawyer 
would have to report far more than current law requires. 
 Consider the facts in Nix v. Whiteside,50 the case in which the U.S. 
Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a state’s require-
ment that criminal defense lawyers report client perjury. In that 
case, the criminal defense lawyer suspected perjury when, a week be-
fore trial, his client added a new and exculpatory detail to his self-
defense story: On the fateful night when he admittedly committed 
homicide, he had seen something “metallic” in his victim’s hand. 
Here we have Edmundson’s two inconsistent stories, the earlier one 
with “something metallic” in the victim’s hand, the later one without. 
What’s the lawyer to do? 
 Virtually all authorities, even the severest critics of a requirement 
to report perjury,51 agree that the first step is to confront the client 
with the inconsistency. If the two stories really can’t be reconciled, 
then the lawyer must do what Edmundson says the lawyer needn’t 
do: decide which story is really true. This is precisely what the law-
yer in Nix v. Whiteside did. He asked his client why, at so late a date 
and on so important a point, he suddenly referred to having seen 
“something metallic.” Here is his client’s fatefully candid reply: “[I]n 
Howard Cook’s case there was a gun. If I don’t say I saw a gun, I’m 
dead.”52 Having heard this attempted reconciliation, the lawyer found 
the “something metallic” story incredible. He concluded that his cli-
ent had added the detail, not because he remembered it belatedly, 
but because he thought he needed to improve his story with false, 
self-serving elaboration. The lawyer further concluded that, because 
he knew his client was about to offer perjured testimony, he could 
not let him take the stand to present that testimony—a conclusion 
                                                                                                                    
 49. Edmundson, supra note 2, at 8. 
 50. 475 U.S. 157 (1986). 
 51. FREEDMAN, supra note 13, at 120. 
 52. Nix, 475 U.S. at 161. 
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which the United States Supreme Court held not to violate the cli-
ent’s constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.53 
 Had the client convinced his lawyer that he really had remem-
bered, rather than invented, the “glint of metal”—a possibility that 
Justice Stevens emphasized in a concurring opinion54—the lawyer 
would have had no duty to report the inconsistency in the stories. In-
deed, under current law, the lawyer would be not only forbidden to 
reveal the inconsistency, but also required to let the client take the 
stand to present the story, including the supplemental detail about 
seeing the glint of metal.55 To know which set of obligations bound 
him—to refuse to allow his client to put in the false testimony, or to 
allow him to put in the true—the lawyer must, contrary to Edmund-
son’s claim, know which story is true and which, false. It cannot be 
enough simply to know that the two are irreconcilable. Otherwise, 
criminal defense lawyers would have to report not just the changed 
stories they find incredible, but all inconsistent stories, which is 
clearly more than current law requires or even permits. 
 There is, I should point out, a way out of this perjury puzzle that 
is entirely consistent with Edmundson’s position. We can simply say 
that, for purposes of determining whether a criminal defendant is 
committing perjury, as for determining whether a civil defendant has 
a contestable case, ordinary standards of knowledge apply. What this 
underscores is precisely my point: Edmundson’s claim that criminal 
defense lawyers cannot know of their clients’ guilt is a very special, 
and peculiar, sense of the word “know.” 
 This is Edmundson’s critical move; we must look at this peculiar 
sense of “know” very closely, even (if you will) skeptically. The stan-
dard answer to “how can you assist those you know to be guilty in 
avoiding conviction” is closely parallel to the answer we saw with re-
spect to jurors, in both form and content. In form, the answer invokes 
the systemic need to protect criminal defendants; criminal defense 
lawyers work to acquit the guilty because that is what it takes to 
protect criminal defendants. In substance, the lawyer’s standard an-
swer is closely related to the jury’s “guilt beyond a reasonable doubt” 
standard: In order to insure that we convict only under that stan-
                                                                                                                    
 53. But, as Prof. Edmundson’s patron sage pointed out, “when any man knows he is to 
be hanged in a fortnight, it concentrates his mind wonderfully.” 2 JAMES BOSWELL, THE 
LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON 393 (1963). 
 54. Id. at 190-91 (Stevens, J., concurring): 
A lawyer’s certainty that a change in his client’s recollection is a harbinger of 
intended perjury—as well as judicial review of such apparent certainty—should 
be tempered by the realization that, after reflection, the most honest witness 
may recall (or sincerely believe he recalls) details that he previously over-
looked. 
 55. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987) (affirming criminal defendants’ right to 
testify). 
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dard, lawyers have to do what, in some cases, involves helping those 
they know to be guilty to avoid conviction.  
 One way of describing what lawyers do for criminal defendants 
would be to say that they treat them as if they do not know that they 
are in fact guilty, even when they do know. That is close to the an-
swer Edmundson would have criminal defense lawyers give: “We 
don’t know our clients are guilty.”  Seen against that background, 
and understood that way, Edmundson’s answer looks a lot less pecu-
liar. In response to it, we might say, “Oh, we see, you’re not saying 
that you don’t know that they are guilty, in the ordinary sense of 
‘know’; what you’re saying is that you’re just acting as if you didn’t 
know it, the way jurors do, though even more aggressively than 
they.” 
 But that raises an immediate and obvious question: Since you can 
explain what criminal defense lawyers do for their clients without 
invoking a special sense of “know,” why invoke it? Here, I believe, is 
where Edmundson’s argument gets into trouble. He gives two rea-
sons, neither of which works as well as he wants. The first, and most 
basic, reason is to avoid having to justify the criminal defense law-
yer’s role in the usual ways (consequentialist, dignity-based, or con-
tractarian). And the second is like unto it: to give criminal defense 
lawyers “breathing space” in which to formulate those very justifica-
tions. Neither works, I’m afraid, for pretty much the same reason, as 
we shall see. 
 With respect to the first, Edmundson’s own odd way of defending 
criminal defense in terms of a special sense of knowledge ultimately 
brings us back to the very standard defenses, in terms of conse-
quences, rights, or hypothetical contracts, that he hopes to avoid. As 
we have seen, special senses of knowledge-terms, like special senses 
of other terms and special uses for other tools, are quite common, and 
the special contexts in which they occur are readily identifiable. But 
sometimes those contexts need more than identification; sometimes 
they need justification as well. As Edmundson himself admits, “[a] 
justification has to be given for the social practices that support the 
creation of special epistemic contexts, especially ones that attach to 
socially created and sanctioned roles, such as lawyer and juror.”56 In 
other words, if he is to have criminal defense lawyers claim not to 
know that their clients are guilty, he must justify that strikingly 
narrow standard of knowledge. Edmundson, again, admits as much: 
“[A] justification is demanded of the social institution—call it the ad-
versary system—which assigns an especially rigorous epistemic 
standard to criminal-defense attorneys.”57  
                                                                                                                    
 56. Edmundson, supra note 2, at 6.  
 57. Id. at 16. 
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 The demand for that justification, curiously, carries us back to 
ground familiar to all scholars of legal ethics generally and criminal 
defense particularly. As Edmundson puts it: 
 Any type of criminal justice system has to be justified, and the 
candidate types of justification emphasize one or more of the fol-
lowing: the social consequences of adopting one or another type of 
system; the extent to which one or another system respects human 
dignity; and the extent to which one, rather than another, system 
would be eligible as an object of reasonable agreement among self-
interested individuals.58   
And our own adversarial system, as he points out, has a distinctive 
element to justify in one of those three ways. We must explain why 
lawyers operate under not just a high, beyond a reasonable doubt 
standard, but, beyond that, under a “super-exacting,” film noir stan-
dard. That, as we have seen, is simply Edmundson’s way of re-
phrasing an old and familiar aspect of our system: the criminal de-
fense lawyer’s knowingly assisting the guilty in avoiding conviction.  
But, if we have to defend that aspect of the criminal defense lawyer’s 
role in the same terms in which it has always been defended, where 
has Edmundson’s argument gotten us? 
 His answer at this point is doubly surprising, and, I have to say, 
doubly disappointing—surprising and disappointing both in what he 
admits he hasn’t given us, and in what he claims he has given us. He 
does not claim to have added anything to the standard defenses of 
the more troubling aspects of the criminal defense lawyer’s role; in-
deed, after reviewing them, he finds what he takes to be the best of 
them wanting.59 
 What, then, does he claim to have given us? In a word, help, in the 
form of the best available experts to assist us in examining the nor-
mative (as opposed to linguistic) justifications of the criminal defense 
lawyer’s role. These experts, he tells us, are none other than criminal 
defense lawyers themselves. “It is they who are the learned profes-
sionals in most frequent sympathetic contact with people accused of 
crime.”60 “In the absence of systematic empirical study, . . . their an-
ecdotal wisdom may be the best we can get” as the basis for evaluat-
ing our current version of the criminal defense lawyer’s role.61  
 Presumably we are to settle for this admittedly second best source 
because “systematic empirical study” is not to be forthcoming. But 
there is still a puzzle here. What exactly has Edmundson done to 
                                                                                                                    
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 18. Of the argument that he takes as the linch-pin of the adversarial system 
defense, Edmundson says “it has a certain plausibility, but may be less than compelling.” 
Id. at 21. 
 60. Id. at 21. 
 61. Id. 
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enlist these supposed experts in aid of our inquiry? One would think 
that they would be eagerly engaged in that inquiry already; it is, af-
ter all, their role that is being questioned. That, Edmundson says, is 
precisely the problem: “They are . . . not inclined toward dispassion-
ate evaluation, largely, I would hazard to say, because they have 
been too willing to accept the popular view of themselves as persons 
regularly engaged in knowingly helping the guilty to avoid just pun-
ishment.”62 Locked in a siege mentality by questions about the moral 
justifiability of their role, particularly the aspect that involves know-
ingly assisting the guilty in avoiding conviction, criminal defense 
lawyers have hunkered down behind what Edmundson sees as a pat-
ently unsound justification of their position, what he calls “an arid 
anti-state ideology.”63 Edmundson hopes that they will divorce that 
“bad ideology” now that he has absolved them of the charge of prima 
facie wrong-doing that drove them into its arms in the first place.64 
 But how has he removed that charge, if what criminal defense 
lawyers need to answer that charge, a justification of the criminal de-
fense system, is precisely what he is liberating them to help us find? 
The key that is to release them from their bad ideology seems to be 
exactly the key to the “good ideology” that everyone, we as well as 
they, are looking for. To put it most pointedly, hasn’t Edmundson as-
sumed his conclusion, leading us in a circular argument, and a very 
wide one at that?  
 He recognizes this implicit charge, and offers an ingenious, but ul-
timately unsatisfying answer—an answer, I’m afraid, that turns out 
to be another iteration of the same circle, a wheel within a wheel. At 
two critical points in his paper, Edmundson distinguishes the need to 
justify the criminal justice system, on the one hand, from the need to 
explain apparently prima facie wrong-doing on the part of criminal 
defense lawyers within that system, on the other.65 This is not, to be 
sure, a distinction without a difference. Unfortunately for this critical 
aspect of Edmundson’s argument, however, it is a difference that 
compounds, rather than corrects, the circularity problem.  
 Let us concede, quite willingly, the distinction Edmundson draws 
between justifying individual, role-required acts, on the one hand, 
and, on the other hand, the systems that require those roles and acts. 
As David Luban and others have nicely demonstrated, the need for 
                                                                                                                    
 62. Id. See also id. at 16:  
It is a regrettable fact that many criminal-defense attorneys bring the same zeal 
they exercise on behalf of their clients to the defense of the adversary system. 
Were this misplaced zeal relaxed, criminal-defense attorneys might be able to 
join the rest of us in cooly examining the justification of the adversary system. 
 63. Id. at 22. See also SIMON, supra note 10, at 173-79 (dismissing the “bogey of the 
state” as “driven by what might be called the Libertarian dogma”). 
 64. Edmundson, supra note 2, at 22. 
 65. Id. at 15-16, 21. 
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defenses of role-specific moralities typically begin with the perception 
that someone is doing, as part of a socially defined role, what would 
appear to be improper outside that role.66 Thus, to take the example 
at hand, criminal defense lawyers are making heroic efforts to acquit 
those whom they know to be guilty; anyone else, working toward that 
end, would be morally culpable of aiding injustice and perhaps le-
gally culpable of obstruction of justice.  
 Having identified this prima facie conflict between role morality 
and ordinary morality, analysis then turns to reducing the two to a 
common denominator. The prima facie wrongful act (working to ac-
quit the known guilty) is shown to be required by, and essential to, a 
social role, such as that of criminal defense lawyer. That role is then 
shown to be required by a particular social institution; in our exam-
ple, the adversarial system of justice. And that system, finally, is 
shown to be critical to advancing certain values that are, themselves, 
shared by ordinary morality. Thus, as we have seen, the criminal jus-
tice system is said to protect either the innocent from wrongful con-
viction, or the guilty themselves from dehumanizing indignities. 
What seems to violate ordinary morality in the short run and at the 
level of individual defense lawyers, their helping acquit the known 
guilty, is thus justified, if it is justifiable at all, in terms of its sys-
tematically advancing the shared values of ordinary morality in the 
longer run. 
 Broken down this way, the justification of particular prima facie 
bad acts is clearly distinguishable from the justification of the system 
in which those bad acts occur. This is just what Edmundson says. 
But notice how, in the very mode of analysis Edmundson seems to 
accept, the justification of the suspicious act stands or falls with jus-
tification of the system. If the prima facie bad act is justified, it is 
only justified because it is required by a system that is itself justified. 
It is this justificatory linkage that Edmundson attempts, I think 
without success, to break. He would have the criminal defense law-
yers deny moral responsibility for assisting those whom they know to 
be guilty to avoid punishment, pending proof that the system in 
which they render this assistance is itself morally justified (and, be-
yond that, also requires this particular sort of act).  
 But, unfortunately for Edmundson’s analysis, the two defenses 
stand or fall together. Think of it this way: You know that the foun-
dation of the building you’re now reading in is distinct from the room 
in which you’re sitting; the foundation’s down there, and you’re up 
                                                                                                                    
 66. My account of the structure of role morality follows LAWYERS & JUSTICE, supra 
note 5, at 128-47 (Chapter 7, “The Structure of Role Morality”). See also MICHAEL D. 
BAYLES, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 18-19 (2d ed. 1989) (describing a similarly-tiered justifica-
tion system). 
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here. But you also know that, if the foundation is not structurally 
sound, the position you’re in is, to precisely that extent, precarious. 
So it is with the morally dubious acts criminal defense lawyers do 
without grounding them in a well-justified adversarial system. With-
out the justification of the system, the act itself remains unjustified, 
and prima facie moral wrongs remain, prima facie, morally wrong. 
 At this point Edmundson wants to interpose his special knowledge 
definition; he wants to tell the criminal defense lawyer that he or she 
doesn’t “really” know that he or she is helping the guilty escape con-
viction. But, as we have seen, this linguistic more itself requires jus-
tification by reference to the adversarial system in a way that, we 
can now see, is precisely parallel to the standard analysis of role mo-
rality. Edmundson’s highly restrictive use of the word “know,” like 
the defense lawyer’s conduct to which it applies, requires justifica-
tion. And the justification for creating that particular social context 
is, precisely, its function in either protecting the dignity of the guilty 
or preventing the conviction of the innocent. But that is none other 
than the standard defense of the adversarial system. 
 It seems we are back, quite simply, where we began. We know 
that assisting the guilty in avoiding conviction is prima facie wrong, 
and we don’t know anything new about the adversarial system that 
would justify that apparent wrong. I will suggest in Part III that we 
are not quite back where we were, if only because the difficulty of 
Edmundson’s heroically creative effort shows us the more general 
difficulty of the task at hand. Before turning to that point, though, I 
want to take a look at what we might call the psychological, as op-
posed to the logical, side of Edmundson’s argument.  
 As we have seen, Edmundson tells us, quite candidly and I think 
quite appropriately and helpfully,67 why he offers us his epistemo-
logical defense of criminal defense lawyers: to free them to assist us 
in undertaking a policy-based re-evaluation of the criminal defense 
paradigm. Laudable though this purpose is, I fear that in undertak-
ing it Edmundson is overly optimistic in two related ways. These are 
two sides of the same psychological coin. He deals explicitly, but I 
think too sanguinely, with the psychological state of conscientious 
criminal defense lawyers; he omits entirely their opposite number, 
criminal defense lawyers who are hopelessly unscrupulous. 
 To take the conscientious first, Edmundson believes that he can 
relieve their anxiety about prima facie wrong-doing by showing them 
that, seen in the proper light or described in the proper way, what 
they are doing is not “really” wrong. He shows them and us how 
                                                                                                                    
 67. See SIMON, supra note 10, at 18 (explaining that he grounds his critique of neutral 
partisanship in jurisprudence rather than ethics, the spirit of the law instead of ordinary 
morality, because reliance on the latter places lawyers at a psychological disadvantage).  
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criminal defense lawyers could, in their off-duty, ordinary language 
hours, know that they are working to acquit the guilty even though, 
in their day-jobs, they don’t “really” know it, in the sense that they 
are role-required to work as if they didn’t know it.68 As a matter of 
logic and linguistics, Edmundson may well be right. 
 But I suspect that, as a matter of psychology, he is missing some-
thing quite important, a distinction quite well supported by both the-
ory and at least anecdotal evidence. What he is missing is the dis-
tinction between knowing that a prima facie wrong is morally justi-
fied and being able to commit that sort of wrong over and over again 
without deep psychological damage. As Bernard Williams has nicely 
demonstrated,69 one can be intellectually convinced that role-required 
acts are justified and yet still retain a strong moral disposition 
against doing them. Soldiers can find killing, even in what they be-
lieve to be just wars, deeply distasteful, even unbearable; lawyers 
may find making the false look true, and the true false, psychologi-
cally painful, 70 even if morally justified.71  
 It will be helpful here to refer you to two real-life examples. In the 
first, Randy Bellows, formerly a staff attorney at the Washington, 
D.C. Public Defender’s Office, describes how, over the course of sev-
eral years, he found his defense of people he knew to be guilty of hei-
nous crimes personally unbearable. In the second, Fred Armani, a 
middle-aged, small-firm general practitioner in Syracuse, New York, 
recounts in a series of videotaped interviews with journalist Fred 
Graham his anguish in representing serial murderer Robert Gar-
row.72 For both cases, my summary is woefully inadequate. To fully 
appreciate the lawyers’ pain, you really need to read Bellow’s graphic 
depiction of his client’s crimes and the heart-rending decline of his 
personal life, particularly his marriage;73 you need literally to see the 
anguish in Armani’s face as he recounts to Graham how he refused to 
tell the parents of his client’s victims where their bodies lay—one in 
                                                                                                                    
 68. Edmundson, supra note 2, at 8-9. 
 69. Bernard Williams, Professional Morality and Its Dispositions, in THE GOOD 
LAWYER, supra note 5, at 259. 
 70. Randy Bellows, Notes of a Public Defender, in THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF 
LAWYERS: CASE STUDIES 69 (Philip B. Heymann & Lance Liebman eds., 1991). 
 71. As Randy Bellows put it, in describing his cross examination of a police officer in a 
criminal trial: 
I did what I had to do. I did not regret it then and I do not regret it today. But I 
had tried to make an honorable man appear dishonorable. And that is a sad thing 
to have to do, even if you are a public defender and even if that is your job. 
Id. at 71. 
 72. Videotape: Ethics on Trial (Jim Wesley 1987) (on file with the Florida State Uni-
versity Law Library) [hereinafter Ethics on Trial]. See also TOM ALIBRANDI & FRANK H. 
ARMANI, PRIVILEGED INFORMATION (1984). 
 73. Bellows, supra note 70, at 69-70.  
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an abandoned mineshaft, the other in a shallow grave outside a 
cemetery.74  
 For our present purposes, however, the point is clear enough: Both 
Bellows and Armani explicitly believed that what they had been do-
ing—in both cases, trying to acquit those they knew to be guilty—
was completely justified, even required, by the Constitution itself. 
Even so, it was almost more than they could bear. It is hard to see 
how the comfort Edmundson offers lawyers like these, the prospect of 
someday finding a full justification for what they are doing now, 
could work any better than the full justification they firmly believed 
they already have.  
 There is another side to this psychological coin. If the examples of 
Bellows and Armani are any indication, at least some criminal de-
fense lawyers will find no solace even in a more thorough defense of 
their prima facie wrong-doing than Edmundson purports to offer. 
But, if Williams’s dispositional theory is any indication, others may 
need no such solace. They will have inured themselves to the very 
real harm they know they do; they will have adapted in either of two 
ways. On the one hand, they will have specifically adapted; they will 
have come to feel no compunction about the harms they do in their 
professional capacities. They will feel no more compunction about 
putting an ax murderer back on the street than a surgeon feels about 
making an incision in a chest. On the other hand—and, for Williams, 
more worrisomely—they may change their general dispositions, what 
he calls general adaptation. They won’t feel any compunction about 
making the false look true and the true, false in their lawyerly lives, 
because they don’t feel any compunction about such things anywhere 
else in life. 
 This raises a possibility—for my money, a very safe bet—that 
Edmundson, perhaps in an excess of charity, overlooks: Some crimi-
nal defense lawyers may not be very admirable people. They may not 
need the moral comfort that Edmundson proffers, much less engage 
with us in the moral inquiry he anticipates, because they may have 
no compunction about what they do.75 And they may have no com-
punction about what they do, not because they believe it to be mor-
ally justified, but because they are wholly unconcerned with moral 
justification. I hope you won’t think it overly cynical of me to suspect 
that, just as some soldiers are sadists, so some lawyers are mercenar-
ies. They may mouth the platitude that every criminal defendant, 
however empty his purse or heinous his crime, deserves a lawyer. 
                                                                                                                    
 74. Ethics on Trial, supra note 72. 
 75. See Paul R. Tremblay, Shared Norms, Bad Lawyers, and the Virtues of Casuistry, 
36 U.S.F. L. REV. 659, 672, 704-08 (2002) (noting and trying to account for and respond to 
the presence of “felons, whores, and jerks” within the legal profession). 
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But don’t expect to learn that, though many of their clients have 
committed heinous crimes, few can’t afford heavy fees. What distin-
guishes these lawyers from their criminal clients is not the social 
benefit of their practices, much less the loftiness of their motives, but 
the barest legality of their deprepations.  
III.   CONCLUSION: TOWARD A SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PERSPECTIVE ON 
THE CRIMINAL DEFENSE PROBLEM 
 To say, as I have said at some length, that Edmundson’s theory 
doesn’t work as intended is not to say that his effort has been fruit-
less. At very least, his theory nicely illustrates the wisdom of prefer-
ing a fertile error over a sterile truth.76 To shift to a more mundane 
metaphor, Edmundson’s effort to sweep around the flanks of the pre-
sent debate between neutral partisans and their critics may confirm 
that the contest between them is joined at more or less the right 
point. If that is so, then the burden of moral proof remains where the 
current generation of legal ethics scholarship has placed it: squarely 
on the defenders of neutral partisanship, to show why the prima fa-
cie wrongs lawyers do are not ultimately wrong, as much in zealously 
assisting in the acquittal of guilty criminal defendants as in socially 
harmful civil representations. 
 But, if I am right, Edmundson’s theory fails, not only at these 
edges, but also in the center. His argument works no better for the 
core of the criminal defense paradigm, merely getting the guilty off 
by putting the state to its proof, than it does for the periphery, get-
ting the guilty off by presenting false defenses and discrediting truth-
ful witnesses. That, too, is significant. On the need for the former 
kind of criminal defense, everyone, reformers and neutral partisans 
alike, is in agreement. But, as Edmundson rightly points out, the 
best contemporary defenses, in terms of preventing the conviction of 
the innocent and protecting the rights of the guilty, leave us deeply 
dissatisfied. As he says, they “excuse[] the lawyer’s conduct, but need 
not relieve her guilty conscience.”77 
 When a necessary social role proves deeply disquieting, even 
damaging, to conscientious people who fill that role, something is 
radically wrong. Edmundson’s piece poignantly reminds us that this 
is true of criminal defense work, and thus pointedly raises a basic 
question: What are we to do? Problems with Edmundson’s argument, 
despite its cleverness, lead me to suspect that one avenue is closed: If 
there were a way to solve the problem in theory, Edmundson or his 
                                                                                                                    
 76. See Hugh Trevor-Roper, History: Professional and Lay, in HISTORY & 
IMAGINATION: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF H.R. TREVOR-ROPER 1, 13 (Hugh Lloyd-Jones et al. 
eds., 1981). 
 77. Edmundson, supra note 2, at 5. 
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predecessors would have found it. I am convinced that, in effect, they 
have proven a negative: There is no way to have our cake and eat it, 
too, no way both to warrant the current model of criminal defense 
work and to guarantee that those who do that kind of work will, at 
the end of their long day, sleep perfectly well through the night. Seen 
from this perspective, Edmundson’s epistemological argument is not 
so much a circle, assuming the justification he is seeking, as a tight-
ening of the screws, forcing us to face deep problems with the posi-
tion we all share.  
 Edmundson reminds us that all civilized societies face the same 
basic dilemma. On the one hand, some citizens do extraordinarily 
anti-social things, including killing their fellow citizens, and some 
cover their tracks and their transgressions in extremely artful ways. 
On the other hand, wholly innocent people will occasionally find 
themselves in deeply incriminating circumstances, often through no 
fault of their own, and sometimes through the machinations of their 
most anti-social compatriots.78 Society must protect itself from the 
former,79 always at risk of confusing them with the latter. And errors 
in either direction are costly: the danger of erroneous exculpation on 
the one hand, the horror of erroneous conviction on the other. We 
know, beyond a peradventure of a doubt, that innocent people have 
been convicted, even executed; we know, equally well, that killers 
(not to mention rapists and child molesters) notoriously kill (and 
rape and molest) again. Dilemma dissolves into paradox: We desper-
ately need to know precisely what, quite often, we cannot know; we 
must act decisively, but we dare not. 
 Our resolution is a motto—better a hundred guilty go free than 
one innocent suffer80—a motto both Edmundson and I whole-
heartedly endorse. But that motto all too often degenerates into a 
state of mind akin to both the just world self-delusion and the ostrich 
syndrome.81 It is unthinkable that the innocent should be convicted, 
so we don’t think about it; innocents shall not suffer, therefore we 
cannot see that they do suffer. We worry over the excesses of zeal on 
the part of criminal defense lawyers, while barely 10% of our crimi-
                                                                                                                    
 78. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969, 
1970 (1992) (“Innocent persons are accused not because prosecutors are wicked but be-
cause these innocents appear to be guilty.”).   
 79. See John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 5 
(1978) (“[S]ociety cannot long tolerate a legal system that lacks the capacity to convict un-
repentant persons who commit clandestine crimes . . . .”). 
 80. See LAWYERS & JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 58 (“Better, we say, that a hundred 
criminals go free than that one person be wrongly convicted.”). 
 81. See id. at 59 n.17 (“The real objection to ‘Better a hundred criminals go free’ is not 
that it is a middle class bromide, but rather that the middle class is so willing to abandon 
it the moment that a suspected mugger or burglar enters the docket.”). 
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nal cases actually go to trial.82 Plea bargains, the routine resolution 
of the vast bulk of our criminal cases, are routinely forbidden in vir-
tually all of our sibling democracies,83 which look with even deeper 
dismay at our death penalty.84 And our prison population, particu-
larly our death row population, is predominantly poor and over-
whelmingly Black.85 
 All societies face an ultimately irreducible dilemma: separating 
the wolves from the sheep, in a world where wolves not only kill 
sheep, but also wear their clothing. It is hard to imagine how that 
problem can ever be made fully to disappear. But our society has long 
confronted a very different set of problems, which compound and 
complicate that basic dilemma. We have good reason to suspect that 
the hundred guilty whom we free are disproportionately wealthy and 
white, while the innocent ones whom we send to prison and to death 
are predominantly poor and Black.86  
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 We, with Edmundson, understandably want to give aid and com-
fort to the lawyers for the latter.87 We would do well to remember, 
however, that lawyers for the former may deserve something very 
different. What’s fair for the goose may be fair for the gander, but it 
doesn’t follow that justice requires identical treatment of shepherds 
and serpents, watchdogs and wolverines. We know that zeal for the 
good and zeal for the bad are both zeal; we also have reason to be-
lieve that one is good and the other, bad. 
 We all know that criminal defense lawyers sometimes work very 
grievous social harms. In terms as old as Plato’s dialogues, they 
sometimes make the false look true and the true, false; in phrases as 
fresh as today’s headlines, they help put dangerous sociopaths back 
on the street. Yet some criminal defense lawyers, I’m happy to say, 
rank with the holiest of secular saints. They live and work among so-
ciety’s morally worst, and economically worst off, assisting them out 
of the sincerest conviction in ways that place the maximum imagin-
able stress on their own social, psychological, and moral well-being, 
all for a fraction of the money they might make in other employment. 
Their work cannot await either perfect justifications for what they 
have to do, or progressive reforms of the system in which they have 
to do it; their hesitation would literally mean others’ deaths, even in-
nocent others’ deaths, at hands that are ultimately our own. 
 Other criminal defense lawyers, I’m only somewhat less comfort-
able in saying, are among the crassest of mercenaries, moral if not 
legal criminals themselves. They represent the dangerous and de-
praved—drug kingpins and corporate defrauders, millionaire mur-
derers and well-connected con-artists, socially secure date rapists 
and drunk drivers—all with apparent indifference to both public in-
justice and private suffering. Some of them, no doubt, are conven-
iently self-deceived; they really believe, in some distorted way, in the 
demonstrably dubious defenses of what they do. But most of them, I 
suspect, simply don’t care. What we mustn’t forget is what they all 
have in common: they make a lot of money helping the evil and 
harming the innocent. Even if love of money were not the root of all 
evil, large incomes would seldom be the stamp of disinterest as to 
their source. Even if it’s not the solution to all mysteries, moral and 
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 87. William Simon has gone a long way in that direction, suggesting that what he 
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political, Deep Throat’s admonition is helpful, here as elsewhere: Fol-
low the money.  
 In philosophy, both moral and linguistic, we have all the refine-
ments we need to know the difference between the saints and the 
sinners, the shepherds and the wolves. But in law and in legal ethics, 
our world is less tidy, and our task more challenging. We need a 
great deal more work to square the demands of our criminal justice 
system with those of our ordinary moral commitments. And we need 
a great deal more work to make criminal defense itself less demand-
ing of moral heroism on the one hand and less rewarding to moral 
mercenarism on the other. Most of all, we need a great deal more 
work toward a world where injustice does not breed poverty, and 
poverty, crime. To believe that Prof. Edmundson’s ambitious and ex-
cellent article does not finish these tasks is certainly not to doubt 
that he has worked at them wisely and well. 
 Thanks again, Bill.88 
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